Markov decision models for the optimal maintenance of a production unit with an upstream buffer

We consider a manufacturing system in which a buffer has been placed between the input generator and the production unit. The input generator supplies at a constant rate the buffer with the raw material, which is pulled by the production unit. The pull-rate is greater than the input rate when the buffer is not empty. The two rates become equal as soon as the buffer is evacuated. The production unit deteriorates stochastically over time and the problem of its optimal preventive maintenance is considered. Under a suitable cost structure it is proved that the optimal average-cost policy for fixed buffer size is of control-limit type, if the repair times are geometrically distributed. Efficient Markov decision process solution algorithms that operate on the class of control-limit policies are developed, when the repair times are geometrical or follow a continuous distribution. The optimality of a control-limit policy is also proved when the production unit after the end of a maintenance remains idle until the buffer is filled up. Furthermore, numerical results are given for the optimal policy if it is permissible to leave the production unit idle whenever it is in operative condition

Source: A Pavitsos, EG Kyriakidis. Computers & Operations Research 2009

A Call for an "Asian Plaza"

From 1995 to early 2002. the dollar rose by a trade-weighted average of about 40 percent. Largely as a result, the U.S. current account deficit grew by an average of about $70 billion annually for ten years. It exceeded $800 billion and 6 percent of GDP in 2006. This posed, and continues to pose, two major consequences for the world economy.

The first was the risk of international financial instability and economic turndown. To finance both its current account deficit and its own large foreign investments, the United States had to attract about $7 billion of foreign capital every working day. Any significant shortfall from that level of foreign demand for dollars would drive the exchange rate down, and U.S. inflation and interest rates up. With the U.S. economy near full employment but already having slowed, the result would be stagflation at best and perhaps a nasty recession.

The current travails of the U.S. economy are clearly related to these imbalances. The huge inflow of foreign capital to fund the external deficits held interest rates down and contributed significantly to the housing bubble that triggered the financial crisis and economic turndown. The sizeable slide of the dollar has indeed added to price increases, notably of oil as the producing countries seek to counter the losses it causes for their purchasing power, and thus greatly complicates the management of monetary policy as it tries to prevent a recession. The world economy is also adversely affected through the impact on other countries, as their currencies rise and they experience significant reductions in the trade surpluses on which their growth had come to depend.

Second is the domestic political risk of trade restrictions in the United States and thus disruption of the global trading system. Dollar overvaluation and the resulting external deficits are historically the most accurate leading indicators of U.S. protectionism because they drastically alter the domestic politics of the issue, adding to the pressures to enact new distortions and weakening pro-trade forces. These traditional factors are particularly toxic in the current context of strong anti-globalization sentiments and economic weakness. The spate of administrative actions against China over the past several years, and the numerous anti-China bills now under active consideration by the Congress, demonstrate the point graphically since China is by far the largest surplus country and its currency is so dramatically undervalued.

The U.S. current account deficit does not have to be eliminated. It needed to be cut roughly in half, however, to stabilize the ratio of U.S. foreign debt to GDP. That ratio was on an explosive path, which would have exceeded 50 percent within the next few years and an unprecedented 80 percent or so in ten. Avoiding such outcomes required improvement of about $400 billion from the levels reached by 2006.

I and colleagues at our Peterson Institute for International Economics have been pointing to these dangers since the end of the 1990s, and calling for corrective action that would include a very large decline in the exchange rate of the dollar. We were confident that such a decline would, as in the past, produce a substantial turnaround in the U.S. external position and it is now doing so. The current account deficit has fallen by more than $100 billion and is likely to drop by another $100 billion or so over the next couple of years. The fall of the dollar by 25-35 percent over the past six years, depending on which index is used, has sharply increased the international competitiveness of the U.S. economy. Exports have been growing at more than 8 percent annually for the past four years and by about 1 2 percent for the last two. Especially with the recent slowdown in U.S. growth, they are now expanding four times as fast as imports.

The internal corollary is of course that U.S. domestic demand, initially residential investment but now also con- sumption, is rising more slowly than output. This inevitable reversal, after a decade in which internal demand climbed more sharply than production, means that the improving trade balance is cushioning the aggregate U.S. slowdown to an important extent. We are in fact experiencing the first episode of "reverse coupling," through which the rest of the world continues to expand and pulls up the United States rather than being devastated by its turndown. This is an early indication of the shift in global economic weights, with the rapidly growing emerging markets now accounting for almost half of world output, as well as a timely unwinding of the chief global imbalance of the early twenty-first century.

THE CURRENT AGENDA

Even on this modestly optimistic prognosis, however, the U.S. deficit will remain too large. The dollar needs to fall by another 5-10 percent to cut the imbalance to a sustainable 3 percent of GDP. This is one of the three key factors that underlie the current set of imbalances that should now be addressed by global economic policy.

The second factor is the continuing surge of China's global current account surplus. That imbalance reached about $400 billion in 2007 and, while growing more slowly in the future, is likely to reach $500 billion by next year. It will thus be almost as large as America's global current account deficit in absolute terms in an economy about one-third the size of the United States. The surplus exceeds 10 percent of China's GDP, an unprecedented level for the world's largest exporting nation. The Chinese authorities have let their currency rise more rapidly against the dollar over the past few months, and continued appreciation at that pace for another two or three years could cut their surplus to a manageable level, but the renminbi has still not climbed at all against a trade- weighted average of the currencies of its main trading partners since the dollar peaked in early 2002 and its own surpluses started to climb.

The third factor is the creation of the euro, which provides a real international monetary rival for the dollar for the first time in almost a century. The dollar has been the world's dominant currency since the abdication of sterling, around the time of the First World War, primarily because it had no competition. No other currency was based on an economy and financial system that even approached the size of the U.S. economy or its capital markets, and thus none could even begin to challenge the dollar in international finance. Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt used to assert correctly that the deutschemark, the world's second leading currency for most of the postwar period, could never rival the dollar because "West Germany was the size of Oregon."

The creation of the euro changes all that. The European Union as a whole, and even the slightly smaller Euroland, has an economy about as large as the United States and exceeds U.S. levels of both external trade and monetary reserves. The euro has already outstripped the dollar in terms of currency holdings around the world and denomination of private bond flotations.

The dollar will obviously remain a major international currency and it may be some time before the euro overtakes it, if it ever does so. But we should expect a steady and sizable portfolio diversification from dollars into euros as private investors, central banks, and sovereign wealth funds seek to align the currency composition of their assets with the new structure of the world economy and global finance. One result will be steady upward pressure on the euro, and downward pressure on the dollar, in the exchange markets over the longer run. A somewhat similar portfolio adjustment took place from yen into dollars during the early 1980s, after Japan finally lifted its controls on capital outflows, adding substantially to the upward pressure on the dollar during that period.

A PROPOSED RESPONSE

The result of these developments is a series of imbalances, some old and some potentially new, that create major risks for the world economy, international financial stability, and the trading system (due to the protectionist impact of large currency overvaluations). They call for urgent new policy initiatives by the G7, the International Monetary Fund, and probably new groupings of key countries that reflect the rapidly evolving power structure of the global economy.

First, there is now a substantial risk of a free fall of the dollar. Its sizable depreciation over the past six years has been gradual and orderly, and it is approaching an equilibrium level. As often happens in the last stages of a major currency swing, however, like the dollar's upward overshoot in 1 984-85 and downward overshoot in 1995, that decline could now accelerate.

Both growth differentials and interest rate differentials have moved sharply against the dollar and are likely to continue doing so for a while. As noted, the current account imbalances remain too large and the maturation of the euro creates an additional incentive for shifts out of the dollar. Perhaps even more importantly, the acute slowdown in U.S. productivity growth undercuts the chief rationale for the strong dollar of the second half of the 1990s, and the advent of stagflation conjures up images of the 1970s, which witnessed three sharp dollar declines - including in 1978-79 its closest approximation to date of a "hard landing."

The G7, in conjunction with the major Asian economies, thus needs to be ready with a contingency intervention plan to limit the pace (and perhaps extent) of dollar decline if a free fall begins to eventuate. They should not seek to block the further realignment of exchange rates that is needed to complete the adjustment process, especially against the Asian currencies as elaborated below. However, dollar depreciation of excessive speed and magnitude could exacerbate the present economic weaknesses in both deficit and surplus countries: raising inflation and interest rates in the United States, perhaps sharply, and weakening export and overall growth in Europe, Canada. Australia, and others. In the present fragile environment, it could also ignite another round of global financial turmoil. The results could be sufficiently severe to tip the current global slowdown into a world recession.

It should in fact be simple for the G7 along with the key Asians, most of whom are already intervening substantially, to agree to moderate the pace and amplitude of the dollar's final decline. One would indeed assume that the needed contingency plans have already been prepared. However, the failure of these same countries to anticipate and respond cooperatively to the current financial crisis generates little confidence in their ability to work together even when the benefits of doing so are blindingly obvious. A new initiative on this front, orchestrated particularly by the United States and Euroland as the issuers of the world's two key currencies, is likely to be necessary.

Second, the remaining decline of the dollar needs to be steered in geographically appropriate directions. It should take place, wholly or very largely, against the renminbi and the currencies of other Asian countries along with a number of oil exporters. These countries are running most of the counterpart surpluses to the U.S. deficit, and piling up massive foreign exchange reserves, and the International Monetary Fund has recently certified that most of them enjoy the option of expanding domestic demand to offset the adverse growth impact of declining trade surpluses.

If these surplus countries continue to resist significant appreciation of their exchange rates, the counterparties to the dollar decline will be the currencies (mainly of Euroland, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia) that have already risen substantially and whose countries are not running substantial (if any) surpluses. The result would be the creation of sizable new imbalances that would produce new problems for the world economy and, due to the protectionist impact of large currency overvaluations, for the already-beleaguered global trading system. In the meantime, further increases in the Chinese (and other Asian and oil producer) surpluses, coupled with the declining U.S. deficit, will place considerable pressure on the trade positions and growth prospects of the rest of the world.

There is no effective monetary coordination, or even cooperation, among the Asian economies despite their Chiang Mai Initiative and the swap agreements that they have arranged over the past few years. Hence any individual Asian country understandably fears that permitting its own currency to appreciate unilaterally could undercut its position against its neighbors and chief competitors, as has in fact happened to Korea since it let the won rise sharply. This collective action problem can be solved only by an Asian Plaza Agreement, or some informal equivalent, through which the main countries in the region agree to let all their currencies rise more or less in tandem with the renminbi once it is permitted to strengthen substantially. Such an agreement would make an important difference: if all the major East Asian currencies (including the yen) moved together, they would climb by trade-weighted averages of a very manageable 12-15 percent each even if they all appreciated by 30 percent against the dollar.

The International Monetary Fund should take the lead in forging such an "Asian Plaza." Now that Euroland has joined the United States in sharply criticizing China's huge surpluses and massive intervention to limit the rise of the renminbi, and especially as Asian and developing countries such as India and Mexico have expressed similar alarms, the International Monetary Fund should be able to forge a sufficient consensus to do the Asians the great favor of enabling them to act together on this issue. A dividend for the International Monetary Fund should be enhanced status in Asia and thus a major deterrent to any future consideration of a rival Asian Monetary Fund.

The third needed initiative would reinforce the first two but address as well the secular impact of the advent of the euro as a global key currency: creation of a Substitution Account at the International Monetary Fund to avoid some of the exchange-rate impact of dollar diversification by providing an off-market alternative for its realization. Such an account, which was actively negotiated and almost came into being during an earlier bout of dollar diversification in the late 1970s, would accept unwanted dollars from official holders in return for Special Drawing Rights at the Fund. The investors in the account would receive a widely diversified and highly liquid asset with a market interest rate while protecting the value of their (very large) remaining dollar assets. The Euroland countries would avoid additional appreciation of their currency. The United States would avoid excessive weakness of the dollar. The International Monetary Fund would gain a new lease on life.

Such an initiative should thus have widespread appeal and all parties should be willing to use part of the International Monetary Fund's large gold holdings to protect the account against valuation losses if the dollar were to fall further in the future, which was the chief sticking point during the previous negotiation. Since the dollar is probably near its lows, at least for a considerable time, a rebound that would instead generate sizable profits for the Substitution Account over the next decade or so is in fact more likely - as would have occurred had it been agreed in 1980.

CONCLUSION

The partial and continuing correction of the world's previously dominant imbalance, the U.S. current account deficit, highlights and indeed exposes several other actual or potential imbalances that pose major risks and must now join it at the forefront of the global policy agenda: avoidance of a free fall of the dollar, correction of the huge Chinese surplus (and other Asian and oil surpluses), the related prevention of a building of new deficits in Europe and other areas where currency appreciation may go too far, and the exchange rate impact of the advent of the euro as a global rival to the dollar.

Different groups should take the lead in addressing each of these problems. The United States and Euroland should devise the contingency plans to counter a free fall of the dollar against the euro, and spur the initial negotiations to create a Substitution Account to limit the market impact of diversification from dollars to euros. The Asians should work out a coordinated realignment of their currencies against the dollar. The International Monetary Fund is the chief institution to implement most of these plans.

This would also be an ideal agenda for the "new G5" recently created by the International Monetary Fund to conduct its revived multilateral surveillance program. The new group includes China and Saudi Arabia, for the oil exporters, as well as the United States, Euroland, and Japan. It could seize the moment to replace the G7 as the key steering committee for the world economy, greatly strengthening the position of the convening International Monetary Fund in the process. A failure to pursue all three components of the strategy will leave the world at substantial risk in the period ahead and deepen the threats to the world economy that are posed by the current financial crisis.

Source: C Fred Bergsten, The International Economy 2008

5 Steps to Creating a Forecast

A sea captain would not try to sail the Atlantic on a cloudy day without a navigational system. Likewise, a healthcare financial manager should always use a reliable forecasting system when evaluating his or her organization's performance. Simple average calculations or untested business targets that provide general direction aren't enough; financial managers need to be able to identify potential challenges, just as a navigation system would identify open-sea hazards. Yet forecasting is not an idea that should be dismissed out of fear of complex spreadsheets and mystical practices of statisticians and PhDs.

Just as ship captains today use powerful navigational systems to plot, monitor, and adjust their voyage, healthcare financial managers can leverage advanced forecasting techniques to better plan, manage, and adjust the decisions that will help them achieve their performance goals. Although an introduction to forecasting warrants a much larger discussion, this article outlines the major steps and considerations that a healthcare manager should address when embarking upon forecasting.

Step 1. Establish the Business Need

Healthcare financial managers need to clearly understand how their forecast will influence business planning and decisions within their organization. Without this important understanding, the resulting effort will very likely produce adverse results. For example, many business managers rely on monthly cash forecasts. These are used by collections managers for setting monthly cash collection goals, by finance to schedule capital expenditures for clinical equipment, and by staffing managers for their budgets.

Those are just a few examples; actually every employee walking through the halls of a hospital is a knowing or unknowing stakeholder in a forecast. Imagine if the cash forecast wasn't in synch with business expenses-the results on reserves could be disastrous. To establish the business need, these key questions should be answered:

* What decisions will the forecast influence?

* Who are the key stakeholders?

* What metrics are needed and at what level of detail?

* How far forward should the forecast project in terms of years, months, weeks, or days?

* How will accuracy be measured, and what is the acceptable level?

* What is the impact of under- and overcasting?

The results of forecasting a metric, whether they include revenue, patient visits, or uninsured bad debt, are always needed to support many organizational decisions. To best answer the above questions, the healthcare financial manager needs to ensure that the forecasting efforts meet organizational needs.

Once these questions have been answered, it is important to identify the potential drivers of a forecast. For example, gross revenue is driven by a number of factors throughout the organization from clinical to financial to strategic. Furthermore, each driver can be grouped into internal factors and external (exogenous) factors.

Healthcare organizations can find internal factors like those shown for key hospital revenue drivers in the sidebar above quantified within their own data. As healthcare organizations adopt more sophisticated techniques for forecasting, they should advance their models to consider key market and strategic business influences like those shown in the sidebar below.

Step 2. Acquire Data

For each business driver and influencing factor, the typical forecasting effort should use at least two years, and ideally up to five years, of historical data. When forecasting efforts have short time horizons in small time periods, fewer data can be used. To collect the most accurate and robust data sets, all available data sources, such as multiple healthcare information systems (HIS), spreadsheets, small departmental databases, and/or an enterprise data warehouse, should be used. By sourcing from multiple areas, differences in organizational behavior can be balanced out to yield the best data set.

All data should be drawn incrementally in their pure form from available data sources to build up the needed accuracy and completeness. To ensure the richest representation of historical events, the data should not be altered and quality issues should be addressed sooner in the process rather than later. A common challenge a hospital may face in forecasting is the practice of purging of aging trial balance data from an HIS after one or two years. This common practice makes accurate forecasting very difficult. Hospital financial managers need to review purging policies or acquire tools to ensure historical data are available for budgeting and planning.

Collecting exogenous data often requires involving third-party data sources. Several potential sources for external data exist in free public sources, such as census data, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), as well as private information firms. Financial managers need to find the optimal source that can provide reliable, high-quality data that can be incorporated into their data structures. In fact, incorporating third-party data can provide valuable benchmarks later in the analysis.

Once the data are collected, it is important to ensure they are clean. Cleaning data often requires more effort than developing the forecast. One of the most efficient ways to perform this process is to visualize the data in trend, distribution, and scatter graphs to find anomalies. This review should be conducted for each toplevel metric and major subgrouping as well as all driving factors to help identify:

* Missing values and gaps: Missing values can be caused by HIS purging policies, changes to business processes and practices, and switching patient access or billing systems. Gaps in valuable historical data can limit forecasting accuracy.

* Outliers: These are business events that may skew a forecast, such as how Hurricane Katrina affected healthcare facilities in Louisiana and Mississippi. Rather than manually looking through all possible slices of data for outliers, it is best to identify and look for specific events that may be unique to an organization, coupled with tools that automatically search data to find outliers.

Examples of these potential issues are shown in the graph, below. Once found, there are many well-known methods for addressing missing data and outlying data points, including statistical methods such as nearest neighbor or forecasted value, or by adjusting the data manually to a known true outcome.

Step 3. Build the Model

Once the business needs, drivers, and influencing factors have been established with the associated historical data, a decision needs to be made on the type of forecasting model to use. The forecasting model is the technique or algorithm that determines the projections based on identified business drivers, influencing factors, and business constraints. There are three major categories of forecasting models: cause-and-effect, time series, and judgment.

Many more forecasting models are also available, and there is no overall best choice. In fact, forecasting models are often combined to produce the most accurate results for a given business need, and it may be necessary to consult with business and technical experts for advice when selecting the best model for a given situation.

As an example, let's explore creating a hospital revenue forecast that has seasonal considerations. The graph at the top of page 104 depicts hospital revenue trending up and peaking at each year end. There are 4,8 months of historical data available, and the most recent five months of data have been selected to test and evaluate the model once it is built. This technique is referred to as training and testing the model.

An application of a cause-and-effect model that incorporates a seasonably and judgment factor is shown in the graph at the bottom of page 104. Seasonal variations can be attributable to a number of reasons, such as a hospital's being located near a ski resort during the ski season, or the "snowbird" effect, when a large population migrates south during the winter months. Clinical factors often have seasonal factors, with the most obvious being flu season. Because the healthcare financial manager in this example knew there were seasonal trends, and ample historical data were available, the model was constructed to include these influences.

Judgment variables can also be used to account for infrequent events such as employee strikes, acquisition or construction of a new acute care center, construction of a new wing, or construction of a new hospital in the area. For example, a healthcare financial manager can use the opening of a physical therapy center at an acute care hospital in 2006 to predict the effect of opening a physical therapy center at a different facility in 2008.

Step 4. Evaluate the Results

Once the model has been built and executed, the resulting forecast accuracy should be evaluated using the most recent time period. Overall model accuracy should be measured using tatistical functions such as F statistic, standard error of the estimate, or R^sup 2^. R^sup 2^ is a statistical measure used for regression models describing what percentage of the changes from month to month can be explained by the forecast. By visualizing the results as shown in the graph below, a healthcare manager can easily understand a model's accuracy.

Model accuracy should be tracked and monitored by calculating the difference from month to month. The accuracy rate may vary from month to month, but in any month, a forecast accuracy of more than 85 percent is considered to be very good. To compare forecast accuracy over time, the simple yet powerful mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) test should be used. If the MAPE increases over time, then not all influencing factors have been included in the model. By constantly keeping an eye on this test, a healthcare financial manager can easily understand whether the forecast model needs to be tuned.

Another powerful tool to test how a model will handle future conditions is scenario analysis. By running different scenarios, especially with known outcomes, healthcare managers can gain a comfort level of model behavior and accuracy. For example, a forecast for inpatient volume could test a base, a conservative, and an aggressive scenario for population growth rates, additions of new managed care populations and employer groups, and clinical initiatives to convert inpatients to outpatients. Under each scenario, the forecast should provide reasonable results.

Step 5. Apply the Forecast

Once all the work has been done to create a highquality forecast, it should be deployed to the stakeholders and end users in a manner tailored to their use. The forecast should ideally be made accessible to all appropriate business areas in reports and analyses packaged to unique enduser perspectives. For example, a contract manager is most interested in revenue forecasts by payer contracts. Each healthcare financial manager should have access to a "sandbox" area to perform "what-ifs" to better understand the impact of business decisions.

An often overlooked value of a forecast model is that it allows financial managers to better evaluate how the hospital is performing when controlled for external factors. When the forecast is for an increase in revenues for a particular month, and the actual performance is below both the forecast and the previous month's actuals, there may be a problem that needs to be resolved. For example, in the case of gross revenue, a hospital could control for the fact that it's the holiday season and no one wants to be in the hospital, or perhaps local employment is down, or people are moving out of the county. By letting the forecast adjust for factors beyond their control, financial managers can objectively judge how items they can control (such as quality of care, prices, and payer relationships) are performing.

A consistent challenge healthcare organizations face is identifying a problem after it has already damaged organization performance. To mitigate this problem, healthcare financial managers should put into place tools to check their forecasts on an ongoing basis so they will be aware of downward trends months before those trends affect the performance of the organization.

"Those WKo Fail to Plan, Plan to Fail"

Today's advanced forecasting techniques allow healthcare managers to plan, manage, and continually monitor where their organization is headed in the future. It is often said that "Those who fail to plan, plan to fail." Through advanced forecasting, healthcare financial managers can ensure that their organizations have a successful voyage to better performance.

Source: Doug Stark, David Mould, Alec Schweikert. Healthcare Financial Management, apr 2008

Inventory control with product returns: The impact of imperfect information

Product returns are characterized by considerable uncertainty on time and quantity. In the literature on inventory management for product return environments best forecasts of future returns are associated with methods that use the most information regarding product return history. In practice, however, data is often scarce and unreliable, while forecasts based on historical data, reliable or not, are never perfect. In this paper we therefore investigate the impact of imperfect information with respect to the return process on inventory management performance. We show that in the case of imperfect information the most informed method does not necessarily lead to best performance. The results have relevant implications regarding investments in product return information systems.

Source: Marisa P de Brito, European Journal of Operational Research 2009

FUZZY PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS MODEL FOR EVALUATING INFORMATION SYSTEM PROJECTS

In this article, the economic evaluation of information system projects using present value is analyzed based on triangular fuzzy numbers. Information system projects usually have numerous uncertainties and several conditions of risk that make their economic evaluation a challenging task. Each year, several information system projects are cancelled before completion as a result of budget overruns at a cost of several billions of dollars to industry. Although engineering economic analysis offers tools and techniques for evaluating risky projects, the tools are not enough to place information system projects on a safe budget / selection track. There is a need for an integrative economic analysis model that will account for the uncertainties in estimating project costs, benefits, and useful lives of uncertain and risky projects. In this study, we propose an approximate method of computing project present value using the concept of fuzzy modeling with special reference to information system projects. This proposed model has the potential of enhancing the project selection process by capturing a better economic picture of the project alternatives. The proposed methodology can also be used for other real-life projects with high degree of uncertainty and risk.

Source: Olufemi A Omitaomu, The Engineering Economist 2007

IT Management Models

Models as I like to call it took three years to develop. It is a unique book containing 72 models to help managers learn about, discuss, and remember management concepts and issues easily.

Models is a truly unique book. The approach taken in this book is unlike any other you have read. It is 200 pages long but the reading will be quick and enjoyable. The models themselves make the book different and interesting to learn. They will also be extremely easy to remember and to use in your day to day activities. In fact, one of my reviewers of the book said he, "used three models in one day while reviewing the book."

Using models in your IT management or project management activities is a natural thing to do. "A picture says a thousand words," they say. I've used models my entire career and now there is an entire set designed specifically for the technology manager or project manager to use in helping you achieve more success.

Models is a fun book. Managing technology is hard work and full of stress. We all need to view our problems from a "lighter side" at times. Some of the models like Bite the head of a frog provide a meaningful management principle and insight while taking a more fun approach to the situation.

Believe me, when you read about this model, you won't forget it for a long time and you will be amazed at how easy it will be to use the model in daily situations.

Models is a practical book. All of my work approaches IT management and project management from a very practical perspective. The job of managing technology resources is complex to be sure but managing doesn't have to be hard and complex when you know what to do, how to go about it, and have the tools to be successful. Models is the fourteenth book of my IT Manager Series publications and an excellent tool to help simplify managing technology resources to allow you to achieve more success.

Who is Models intended for

Models is primarily intended for IT managers of all levels, project managers, team leaders, and supervisors. However, it is a tool that can be understood and used by virtually anyone.

What is a model Good question. A model starts with a picture or simple graphic used to depict a specific management principle or issue. There are 72 models in the book. Each model has a unique graphic, a brief description, and bullet points that highlight key points of the model. In addition, there is a full page discussion of the model and each of the key points.

Models are grouped into six management discipline categories. The book is organized so you may learn the models one by one or focus in on a specific management discipline to learn about that area of management. The management discipline categories are:

- IT Assessment

- Strategy and Planning

- Project Management and Process

- Organization and Staff

- Financial Management

- Measurements and Communication

The models cover a complete overview of the requirements of an IT manager, delve into specifics of project management, and focus specifically on issues pertinent to information technology.

Source : Business Wire. New York: Nov 3, 2008

Multi-modal visual experience of brand-specific automobile design

This article presents a questionnaire study of brand-specific perceptions of automotive design using subjective rating methods. The purpose of the paper is to explore the multiple modalities of the visual product experience of automobile design as perceived by the general public. Furthermore, the experiences were analysed using a framework for visual product experience (VPE). Design/methodology/approach - Respondents were asked to assess the design of two car models at an international car show in relation to brand perceptions and visually perceived attributes using, among other tools, visual analogue scales. Analysis was done using a qualitative technique. Findings - Results from the study indicate that there is a correlation/relation between experiential modes, in that respondents tended to rate attributes consistently high or low across modes. This implies that if the aesthetics are not perceived as favourable, neither is the expression of the car. Furthermore, respondents' assessments of aesthetic appeal and expression are on an average strikingly similar, suggesting that the level of aesthetic appeal correlates with the level of semantic understanding of the design. The general rating of emotional response follows a similar consistent pattern for the two studied cars. Originality/value - Study approach as a way to gain insights into subjective perceptions of products based on appreciation and interpretation of visual product form. VPE framework recognising, mapping and clarifying the multiple modes of the visual experience.

Source : TQM Journal, Author :Anders Warell